Intellectual property protection (IPP) is becoming increasingly important as information is more quickly and easily accessible. This is particularly apparent in the semiconductor community, where extensive design and code reuse motivates a need for good IPP schemes. Graph partitioning is a critical optimization problem that has many applications, particularly in the semiconductor design process. It is the only synthesis task conducted at all levels of the design process. We o er an IPP technique for graph partitioning which watermarks solutions to graph partitioning problems so that they carry an author's signature. Our technique is completely transparent to the actual CAD tool which does the partitioning and is implemented by preprocessing and postprocessing alone. Intellectual property protection of partitioning algorithms and solutions goes beyond the realm of CAD and VLSI, since partioning is widely used step in many engineering and scienti c areas.
Introduction

Motivation
The exponential growth of VLSI design integration has a number of major rami cations on the design process and the associated research. We focus on one exceptionally important one: intellectual property protection. Intellectual property protection (IPP) is becoming increasingly important as information is more quickly and easily accessible. In the semiconductor industry, explosive proliferation of reusable core-based designs in particular is motivating a need for e ective and e cient IPP schemes and tools. We address this issue in the context of graph partitioning.
Graph partitioning is a critical optimization problem that has many applications, particularly in the semiconductor design process. Higher levels of integration emphasizes a need for even more logical and physical level partitioning. Partitioning is the only synthesis task conducted at all levels of design process, from the system Gup90, Kal97, Vah95] and behavioral levels Geu91] to the logic synthesis Bea92, Dey91] and physical design levels Alp95]. Partitioning also plays an important role in design analysis: it is widely studied in the simulation Con94. Tha92], manufacturing, testing Sri91], and emulation But95] literature. Outside of VLSI design, partitioning is a widely used step in many engineering and scienti c areas. It has applications in such diverse areas as parallel programming Pot90] and database storage She97].
We o er an IPP technique for graph partitioning which watermarks solutions to graph partitioning problems so that they carry an author's signature. We developed, implemented, and evaluated ve di erent schemes for watermarking partitioning solutions. All of our schemes use the same basic principle of mapping an author's signature into a set of constraints and then modifying the partitioning objective function so that a disproportionate number of these constraints are satis ed. Our technique is completely transparent to the actual CAD tool which does the partitioning and is implemented by preprocessing and postprocessing alone.
Watermarked solutions have low quality degradation, yet carry signatures that are convincingly unambiguous, extremely unlikely to be present by coincidence, and di cult to detect or remove without completely resolving the partitioning problem. Watermarking is based on new idea of de ning a set of constraints and modifying the objective function in such a way as to encourage a disproportionate number of these constraints to be satis ed.
We introduce our approach in the next subsection using a small example. 
Illustrative Example
Here we outline an example of watermarking on a graph partitioning instance. Consider the graph of gure 1(a). We will call this graph G16. This graph has 16 vertices and 31 edges. It was created randomly by specifying that there are 16 vertices and that each potential edge will occur with an independent probability of 0.25. We wish to demonstrate that, for even for a graph this small, it is possible to watermark solutions of the graph partitioning problem. We also show, in general, that the potential for watermarking exists by demonstrating what happens to the number of solutions of various qualities when certain constraints are enforced.
For the sake of this example the graph partitioning problem is formally de ned as follows: Variations of this problem allow for weighted vertices or edges, hyperedges rather than edges, and relaxed balance constraints. Finding a solution to any of these problems with minimum edge-cut is NP-hard Gar79]. For this example, we are concerned with 2-way exactly balanced graph partitioning.
The core idea behind our watermarking technique is to select a set of constraints that correspond to our watermark and then to nd a solution to the problem that satis es a disproportionate number of these constraints. We can do this by preprocessing on a problem instance and then running the partitioner (any partitioner) on the modi ed instance. The number and type of constraints imposed, as well as the number that are satis ed determine the strength of the watermark. For this illustrative example, our constraints will be of the type \vertex v 1 and vertex v 2 must be on the same side of the partition". We will enforce this merging the selected vertices as a preprocessing step. Here constraints can never be broken so we face a simple tradeo between the number of constraints added and the quality of our solutions. If, for each constraint, v 1 and v 2 are simply selected randomly from the set of vertices, then the probability of each constraint having occurred in some solution by coincidence alone is 1 2 . Since these probabilities are independent of each other, the probability of X constraints all occurring in a solution by coincidence is 1 2 X . Random constraints do not encode a signature, but pseudorandom constraints have the same statistical properties and can encode a signature. Most partitioning heuristics will quickly nd the optimal solution of a problem instance this small, so rather than report on the output of an actual partitioner, we will display an exhaustive list of the number of solutions of various qualities. We do not count partitions that are mirror images of partitions we have already listed. Creating this list takes exponential time in the number of vertices, but is feasible for such a small example. Figure 3 shows this plot. The vertical axis represents edge-cut values and the horizontal axis represents number of solutions on a logarithmic scale. The outermost curve shows the number of solutions that have various edge-cuts. From this curve one can see that the min cut is 9, that the max cut is 25, and that (for example) there are 371 distinct solutions with an edge-cut of 13. It is important to observe that for this graph there is only one solution with a cut of the minimum size 9. Thus it is unreasonable to expect to nd a watermarked solution which also has cut value of 9.
The other curves correspond to the results of progressively merging pair after pair of vertices together. Eventually, enough vertices are merged together that it is impossible to nd balanced solutions at all. In this case this occurred when 12 constraints were enforced. The pairs of vertices contracted for this example are (in order) (16,14), (6,2), (16,4), (9,8), (5,16), (9,4), (11,10), (9,4), (15,16), (9,7), (2,3), (13,5), (13,14), (10,12), (14,3), and (9,8). These pairs encode a signature. They were selected using a cryptographically strong pseudorandom number generator seeded in a way that will be discussed later. After the rst three of these pairs are contracted ( gure 1(b)), the min cut is 10, the max cut is 23, and there are 37 di erent solutions with an edge-cut of 13. All of these solutions satisfy all three constraints and hence there is at most a one in eight chance of coming up with one of these solutions by coincidence. Hence a partitioner that returned the partition with an edge-cut of 10 would yield a high quality, watermarked solution.
Figures 4(a) and 4(b) show similar graphs for di erent lists of vertex pairs. It is clear that with the addition of each constraint of this type, the number of solutions of various qualities that satisfy all of the constraints drop by about 50%. This tends to occur evenly throughout the distribution of edge-cut values. As the number of enforced constraints increases, vertices tend to group together into clusters that become big enough to have serious e ects on the balance criteria for partitioning so the drop slowly grows larger than 50%. This does not normally become a concern until a relatively large number of these constraints have been imposed. From this, it should be apparent that the potential to watermark optimization problem solutions in larger graphs is astounding.
Paper Organization
The rest of this paper is organized in the following way. Section 2 provides an overview of related research. Section 3 describes the objectives of watermarking of graph partitioning instances and of optimization problems in general and de nes several metrics with which to measure, compare, and evaluate the relative success of a watermark. Section 4 details our watermarking approach. Experimental results are presented in section 5.
Related Work
This section reviews related work in the areas of graph partitioning, watermarking, and cryptog-raphy.
Graph Partitioning
The graph partitioning problem is ubiquitous in many elds of computer science and engineering. It has important applications in areas ranging from work-load balancing in parallel programming Pot90], to database storage She97] and in particular to VLSI design and CAD techniques Alp95]. Throughout the process of VLSI circuit design and synthesis graph partitioning plays a key role. It has applications in system design, behavioral synthesis, system-level synthesis, packaging, rapid prototyping, and testing. Note that a hypergraph is a very natural representation of a circuit. The vertices represent the cells of the circuit and carry weight according to their size. The hyperedges represent the nets that connect the cells and are typically unweighted ( gure 5). A high quality partitioning algorithm is crucial to many IC designs in that it a ects the IC's feasibility, cost, and quality.
Fast prototyping of VLSI designs is a good example of the importance of graph partitioning to the VLSI design process. Fast prototypes can be made by mapping some or all of the circuit onto a group of connected FPGAs (Field Gate Programming Arrays). The partitioning goal is to satisfy the FPGA device's speci c timing, area, and I/O constraints so as to t within the cluster of FPGAs. If the circuit is not partitioned well, it will require more FPGAs to implement and thus will be both more expensive and slower. Graph partitioning is also useful for nding good solutions to other problems. For example, the problem of nding ll reducing orderings for sparse matrix factorization Pot90] involves searching for small vertex separators. Edge separators found by graph partitioning provide a good starting point to nding good vertex separators.
The graph partitioning problem is NP-complete. Therefore many heuristic methods are proposed to nd high quality partitions. Alpert and Kahng Apl95] provide a thorough survey of partitioning for VLSI applications. In this paper, we watermark partitions produced by the circuit partitioner of Alpert, Huang, and Kahng Alp97]. We also watermark partitions produced by METIS, a partitioner by Karypis and Kumar Kar95] which is used primarily for parallel programming applications.
Watermarking
Steganography (literally, \hidden writing") has a history spanning thousands of years and refers to techniques ranging from the use of invisible ink, to the embedding of subliminal advertisements into television and radio broadcasts, to microdots that contain pages of information to the hiding of messages on audio records that are revealed when the record is played backwards, to the inclusion of hidden words on an Internet web page that encourage Internet \search engines" to reference the page more often or prominently.
Watermarking is a form of steganography that embeds information into a digital media. This information is useful for the purpose of identi cation, annotation, and copyright. Typically the embedded information is di cult to detect and to remove. The proliferation of digitized media and the prominence of the Internet are creating a mounting need for copyright enforcement schemes to protect ownership. Hence, watermarking of digitized media is becoming increasingly common Ben96, Tew97] .
Recently, Hong and Potkonjak Hon97] developed a method for watermarking Vertex Coloring (VC) problems and showed several applications in the behavioral synthesis domain. To the of our best knowledge, this is the only previous watermarking technique capable of watermarking solutions to optimization problems. Their method is very similar to ours in that they encode watermarks as added constraints to the original problem. There are several di erences between two approaches, however. We address a di erent optimization problem, partitioning. We demonstrate the e ectiveness of our approach on both CAD designs as well as parallel processing applications. We also develop ve di erent techniques for constraint encoding, and we do much more comprehensive study of their e ectiveness.
Cryptography
Steganography is closely related to cryptography, which has generally received more attention. The traditional task of cryptography is the enciphering of messages in secret code in such a way as to limit access to the message to those who know how to decipher the message. The unencrypted message is called the plaintext and the encrypted message is called the ciphertext. In modern cryptography, it is typically assumed that both intended and unintended receivers of the message know the method of encryption, but only the intended receivers know the proper secret key that allows them to view the unencoded message. Although the encrypted message can serve as proof of authorship to a receiver of the message who knows how to decrypt it, once the message is decrypted this \signature" is removed and there is no proof of ownership Sch95].
Several cryptographic techniques are relevant to the rst step of our watermarking approach, that of nding a set of constraints to add to the instance of the optimization problem that is to be watermarked. The speci c method we use involves the cryptographic hash function MD5 Riv92], the public-key cryptosystem RSA RSA78], and a stream cipher which may be equivalent to the stream cipher RC4 Htt1]. We use the PGP 
Objectives and Metrics
This section outlines the objectives of watermarking techniques in general and presents metrics with which to measure, compare, and evaluate watermarking techniques on various instances of optimization problems, including those of graph partitioning problems.
Objectives
The objectives of watermarking techniques vary wildly depending upon the goals of the watermarking itself and upon the type of host media that is being watermarked. We assume that the core goal of the watermarking is to embed information about the author or owner into an instance of a media. Sometimes we refer to this information as the signature. The signature can only be seen by some target audience that knows how to view it. This audience may be everyone (everyone notices it immediately), everyone who knows the method to look for it (anyone can run a simple program to see it), or a very small group that includes the author and possibly law enforcement agencies (special knowledge, such as a decryption key, is required to see it).
The following are necessary fundamental properties of an e ective watermark.
Low overhead. The watermark should have limited negative impact upon the quality of the instance of the host media.
Proof of ownership. The watermark should be clear and convincing evidence to someone who can read it that this instance of the host media was watermarked by the owner.
Hard to nd ghost signatures. Ghost signatures, or more simply ghosts, are false signatures or watermarks that are not actually there. An e ective watermarking method must assure that the task of nding a ghost signature is computationally di cult.
There are many properties of watermarks that may be considered optional. Depending upon the speci c goals of a watermark and upon the media the watermarking technique is applied to, each one of these properties may be inapplicable, absolutely necessary, or even undesirable. Our technique satis es all of the properties listed below:
Transparency. The watermarking technique is done in such a way as to be completely invisible to the tools whose outputs are watermarked by it. This allows the watermarking technique to be used in conjunction with with any existing or future set of tools that perform the same functions. To be transparent, watermarking must be done as either a preprocessing or a postprocessing step.
Di cult to detect. The watermark should be di cult to detect. For many types of watermarking techniques, including ours, it may be easy to remove watermarks if they are detected, so being di cult to detect is a prerequisite to being tamperproof.
Tamperproof. The watermark is di cult or impossible for an adversary to remove without severe negative impact upon the quality of the watermarked object if the adversary cannot detect the watermark directly, but does know or suspect that a watermark is present.
Di cult to forge signatures. It is di cult for an adversary to place a watermark on an instance of a media that claim that the instance belongs to anyone other than the adversary. If adversaries can watermark instances with signatures other than their own then they can create a campaign of disinformation that claims that poor or distasteful products were created or sanctioned by some other group.
Metrics
The objectives of watermarking of optimization problems motivate several metrics. These metrics allow the measurement, comparison, and evaluation of watermarks on various problem instances. Generally, the goal of watermarking is to nd a favorable tradeo between the design metric degradation and the strength of authorship proof.
Design metric degradation. Since solution quality is well de ned for optimization problems, the quality degradation can be easily expressed. For minimization problems it is the ratio of the watermarked solution's quality to an unmarked solution's quality minus 1.
Strength of authorship proof. The probability P c that a solution to an optimization problem that was not watermarked by a certain author coincidentally contains that author's signature must be low. This clearly must be low so that a competitor's solution is convincingly unlikely to carry your watermark purely by coincidence. What should be considered \convinc-ingly unlikely" is very subjective. Probabilities in the range of 10 ?3 to 10 ?12 may arguably be acceptable. If brute force attacks to nd ghost signatures are possible, probabilities as high as 2 ?56 may be necessary.
Resiliency metrics. Attacks that attempt to tamper with a solution until the solution is no longer watermarked usually tradeo degradation of the strength of authorship proof with degradation of the solution quality. The strength of authorship proof should be su ciently strong so that it can degrade somewhat and still be strong enough to be convincing. If the watermarking protocol is such that the possibility of brute force attacks exists, then the strength of authorship proof of a tampered solution should be also be strong enough to resist brute force attacks to nd ghost signatures.
Approach
General Approach
The approach for watermarking solutions for graph partitioning problems is shown in gure 6(a). The general strategy is to add some number of constraints of some type and to satisfy a disproportionate number of them. The type of constraints and the tactics by which they are encouraged to be satis ed are discussed later in this section. All of them have in common the selection of \random" vertices or (hyper)edges. These selections are not truly random and are actually where the user speci c information of the watermark are used. Selections are chosen by a pseudorandom number generator which is seeded by the signature. This can be done in a wide variety of ways and this encoding process can perhaps even be expanded and improved upon to allow additional features like group signatures Cha91, Che94] and undeniable signatures Boy91, Cha89] .
The current process we use for generating constraints is shown in gure 6(b). It is done in this way so that the encoding scheme yields su ciently randomized constraints and so that it is di cult to detect signatures and to forge signatures.
The gure shows both the encoding process and the process by which one veri es that a signature is present. MD5 is a one-way hash function. RSA is a public key encryption system. \Alleged RC4" is a stream cipher. We use MD5 and RSA only from within the PGP software package. The bitstream that is the output of \alleged RC4" is a cryptographicly strong pseudorandom bit-stream. The \simple encoding" box uses it for tasks like choosing \random" vertices and (hyper)edges. To verify a signature, one must show both that the signature is present in the partitioning solution and that the signature corresponds to the text le and the pgp public key of the supposed owner. Demonstrating that the signature is in the partitioning solution is done by showing that enough of the signature's constraints are satis ed to be unusual. One can show that the signature corresponds to the text le and the owner's public key by running PGP.
The protocol for deciding what RSA keys and text les are used is unspeci ed. If there is any \degree of freedom" in their selection, then a brute force attack may be able to nd ghost signatures. In order for this attack to be computationally di cult, P c must be su ciently small. P c <= 2 ?56 is likely good enough.
Tactics
Watermarks are added by de ning a set of constraints that correspond to the watermark and then nding a solution that satis es a su ciently disproportionate number of these constraints. The success of this endevour can be measured by amount of design metric degradation and the strength of authorship proof. There are many di erent types of constraints that can be de ned. Additionally, there are many tactics by which these constraints can be imposed in such a way that it is likely that solutions will satisfy a disproportionate number of them. In the introduction we discussed constraining pairs of vertices to be on the same side of the partition by merging them together. Here we discuss that tactic as well as four others. Later, in the experimental results section, we show how they actually perform. The choice of which tactic to use and how many constraints to add can make the di erence between poor watermarking results and excellent results.
Each tactic uses only preprocessing on the problem instance. Postprocessing methods such as FM re nement Fid82] can be used in conjunction with any of them. The postprocessing should yield a solution with improved edge-cut (lower design metric degradation), but decreased strength of authorship proof (due to constraints being broken). This may yield a more favorable tradeo between these two quantities.
The constraints imposed by each tactic are completely independent of each other. Because of this, the same constraint may occur several times. In this case it is either satis ed many times or broken many times. Each constraint involves some \random" choice such as choosing a random vertex or edge. As we mentioned before, these choices are not actually random, but use a cryptographically strong pseudorandom number generator.
Because all of the constraints are chosen independently, P c , the probability of a solution carrying an author's watermark purely by coincidence, can be computed by a simple binomial. P c is a metric for the strength of authorship proof. Let X be the number of constraints imposed, x be the number of these that are not satis ed, and p be the probability of a constraint being satis ed purely by coincidence. Note that if constraints were not independent of each other, p would not be well de ned. Now, P c = the probability that x or less of X constraints are satis ed by coincidence = P x i=0 ( ? X i (p) X?i (1 ? p) i ).
Overestimating the value p is acceptable, since this will always make P c larger. A larger value for P c means a weaker strength of authorship proof, so this can never be used to improve the supposed strength of our watermark. This allows us to estimate p when it's exact value is not known.
Each tactic depends upon some assumptions. These generally relate to how the graph or hypergraph is speci ed and to whether the actual partitioner is capable of partitioning certain types of graphs. They are speci ed with the description of the tactic, but some commonalities are mentioned here.
In order to watermark, a \canonical" ordering of the vertices must be provided with the graph or hypergraph speci cation. For all of our tactics we are concerned about the relationships between particular sets of vertices or (hyper)edges and the nal partition. In order to properly specify exactly which vertices or (hyper)edges we are referring to, a vertex ordering must be provided. Although it is possible to simply choose an arbitrary ordering, it will require solving the graph isomorphism problem to even determine if we are partitioning the same graph as an attacker who selects a di erent ordering. Since the graph isomorphism problem is generally considered \hard" Gar79], this is a bad idea. Hence a \canonical" ordering must be provided. Although it may be possible to have watermarking tactics that do not require this list, all of the tactics below do. For similar reasons, some of the tactics also require a \canonical" (hyper)edge ordering as well. For applications like VLSI design where watermarking is likely to occur, the problems are speci ed very thoroughly and this information is readily available.
Some of the tactics do not apply to certain types of partitioners as they may require that the partitioner function correctly on graphs that have certain properties such as weighted vertices or weighted (hyper)edges. Note that partitioners that can accept hyperedges can automatically accept weighted hyperedges by simply adding duplicates. All of the tactics will work on either graphs or hypergraphs. We usually will only refer to graphs, but note that the term "edge\ may safely be substituted with "hyperedge\.
The tactics follow below. For each tactic we discuss the type of constraints, the technique by which they are enforced, the conditions that must exist to use the tactic (assumptions), and the method of computing p, the probability of a constraint being satis ed purely by coincidence. This value p is used to compute P c , as mentioned above.
Merge random pairs of vertices. Random vertices v 1 and v 2 are selected. If they are in the same partition then the constraint is considered satis ed. Otherwise it is broken. The constraint is imposed by merging the vertices together before the partitioning occurs. The merging process yields a graph that has both weighted vertices and edges. The graph partitioner must be able to partition this type of graph in order for this tactic to be viable. Each constraint is satis ed by coincidence in a 2-way partitioning solution with probability 0:5, so p = 0:5. For a k-way partitioning solution, each constraint is satis ed by coincidence with probability p = 1 k .
Add edges between random pairs of vertices. Random vertices v 1 and v 2 are selected.
As with the \merge random pairs" tactic, the constraint is considered satis ed only if the two vertices are in the same partition. To make this more likely to occur, an edge is added between the two vertices. If there already is an edge between them, it's weight is increased by one. The graph partitioner must be able to partition a graph that has weighted edges for this tactic to work. As above, the constraints are satis ed in a k-way partition by coincidence with probability p = 1 k .
Merge random edges. Choose a random edge e. The constraint is considered satis ed only if all of the vertices that are incident to the edge are in the same partition. The constraint is imposed by merging all of the vertices together. As with the other merging tactic, the partitioner must be able to partition a graph that has weighted vertices and edges. Additionally, a \canonical" ordering of the edges must be provided so that a random edge may chosen in a meaningful way. Let E be the number of edges in the original graph. Let c(S) be the edge-cut of a particular partitioning solution S. Let c be the value of the minimum k-way cut on the graph. Let c 0 be an estimate to c that is expected to be less than or equal to c. In this paper, we simply guess a \reasonable" value for c 0 , but some methods Aru91] can produce a true lower bound. Each constraint is satis ed by coincidence in a particular k-way partitioning solution S with probability p = (e?c(S)) e . If we wish to provide a single value for p that will not vary with the edge-cut of the solution we are considering, using p = (e?c 0 )
e will work. This will overestimate the true value of p and produce a single conservative value for P c .
Thicken random edges. Choose a random edge e. As with the \merge random edge" tactic, the constraint is satis ed if all of it's terminals are in the same partition. This tactic makes this more likely to occur by adding one to weight of the edge. We refer to this as \thickening" the edge. Using this tactic requires that a \canonical" ordering of edges is provided, and that the underlying partitioner can partition graphs with weighted edges. As discussed above, the probability of a constraint being satis ed by coincidence is p = (e?c(S)) e . A conservative value for this for all graphs is p = (e?c 0 )
e .
Drop random edges. Choose a random edge e. The constraint is considered satis ed if the edge is cut in the partitioning solution (all of it's terminals are not in the same partition). Otherwise the constraint is not satis ed. This tactic removes the edge from the graph, so that constraints are more likely to be satis ed. To use this tactic, a \canonical" list of edges must be provided. The host graph partitioner does not need to be capable of partitioning weighted graphs. Let e be the number of edges in the original graph and let c(S) be the edge-cut of a particular partitioning solution S. Each constraint is satis ed by coincidence in a particular k-way partitioning solution S with probability p = c(S) e . If we wish to compute a single value for p that will protect all solutions whose edge-cut is less than or equal to some value C than we can set p = C e . Clearly we must choose a value for C that is greater than or equal to the edge-cut of our watermarked solution.
Experimental Results
We report watermarking results on several benchmarks from the CAD Benchmarking Laboratory (available at ftp.cbl.ncsu.edu or on the web at http://vlsicad.cs.ucla.edu/). The benchmarks we report on in this paper are shown in gure 7. The rst column names the circuits. The second through fourth columns pro le the structure of the circuits. Columns ve and six show the lowest and highest edge-cut values for which 2-way partitions will have a probability P c of coincidentally containing the watermark that is less than or equal to the one we report. These values are only used in the analysis of some of the tactics. The \merge hyperedges" and \thicken hyperedge" tactics use the \low" values. The \drop hyperedges" tactic uses the \high" value. Columns seven and eight show the same data for 4-way partitions.
The underlying partitioner we use is a circuit partitioner by Alpert, Huang, and Kahng Alp97]. We experimented with both 2-way and 4-way partitioning. We compared ve di erent watermarking tactics which were described in the previous section.
Figures 8(a) through 8(f) show 2-way partitioning. The x-axis represents the edge-cut of the watermarked solution. The y-axis (scaled logarithmically) represents the probability P c of achieving a solution by coincidence. There are ve curves; one for each tactic. P c is computed by a binomial formula as described in the previous section. The binomial formula takes values X , x, and p as inputs. The value p can be computed in an obvious manner. For example, for 2-way partitioning on the graph 19ks, the \merge random pairs of nodes" tactic and the \add hyperedge between random pairs of nodes" tactic both use p = 0.5. The \merge random hyperedge" and \thicken random hyperedge" tactics use p = The values of X and x are not directly available from the gures, however. As an example, though, consider the point located at about (126, 3 10 ?9 ) on gure 8(a). This is a point in the middle of the \drop random hyperedges" line. This point corresponds to dropping 300 random hyperedges (possibly \dropping" the same hyperedge more then once) from the circuit and then partitioning the resultant hypergraph. When this is done, 47 of the constraints are satis ed and 253 are broken. That is (if each of the 300 hyperedges selected were di erent) 47 of the 155 hyperedges that were cut are from our 300! This is amazing when you consider that the expected value is around 14. instead, then we would get P c = 7:260486 10 ?13 , but would only protect solutions whose edge-cut was less than or equal to our own with this strength.
Figures 9(a) through 9(f) show 4-way partitioning. Watermarks are much stronger for 4-way partitioning then they are for 2-way partitioning. The reasons for this are twofold. First, heuristics for 4-way partitioning are not as successful as heuristics for 2-way partitioning in general. There is a lot of room for improvement in 4-way partitioning, whereas many heuristics are quite competitive at nding 2-way partitions with low cuts. Second, there are many more solutions to a k-way partition then there are to a 2-way partition. More solutions translates directly into a less debilitating impact on the number of solutions of a particular quality when a constraint is enforced.
To illustrate this further, consider gure 5. This shows watermarking results on the partitioning of two graphs with METIS Kar95]. The graph "3elt\ has 4720 nodes and 13722 edges and represents a 2-dimensional nite element mesh while the graph "brack2\ has 62631 nodes and 366559 edges and represents a 3-dimensional nite element mesh. Both of these graphs are available with the METIS software package. Figure 5 clearly demonstrates that watermarks on k-way partitions, where k > 2 achieve much better strength of authorship proofs.
Apparent in all of the circuit partitioning expermental results is the superiority of the fth, "drop random edges\ tactic. It displays a very linear pattern on these gures, usually with a slope quite close to ?1. Although the other tactics do occasionally perform better that this one, it is only by a small amount and usually only for a small region of the graph. This tactic's superior performance stems from a favorable tradeo between the cost in edge-cut that is paid with each added constraint and the payo in the strength of authorship proof that is gained with each added constraint. As an example of it's e ectiveness, consider that with only 11% overhead over the best result found we can 
Conclusion
Partitioning is an ubiquitous task in all synthesis and veri cation steps of the design process. We proposed the rst approach for intellectual property protection of partitioning solutions using a watermarking scheme. For the rst time, objective function modi cation watermarking schemes are proposed and demonstrated.
The technique and our implementation are completely transparent to the synthesis CAD tools and are implemented by preprocessing and postprocessing alone. Solutions produced using our approach simultaneously are very close to the best known solutions, carry signatures that are exceptionally unambiguous, are extremely unlikely to be present by coincidence, and are di cult to detect or remove.
